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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida family law underwent a steady accretion of case law during
the past two years with the courts deciding over one hundred and eighty
cases, and more than fifteen of these cases were of first impression in
this state. The legislature added permanent insanity as a ground for
divorce and hedged it with safeguards to protect the insane spouse.'
The legislature has also indicated a disenchantment with the former
handling of juvenile delinquents by providing for the fingerprinting and
photographing of juveniles who are arrested for felonious acts2 and by
depriving the juvenile court of jurisdiction when a minor has been
indicted for a crime calling for the death penalty or life imprisonment.8
In a perhaps more constructive vein, the legislature has created a new
Division of Youth Services which has responsibility over dependent and
delinquent juveniles.4
1. See note 15 infra.
2. See note 179 infra.
3. See note 180 infra.
4. See note 181 infra.
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II. MARRIAGE AND ANNULMENT
A. Miscegenation
The Supreme Court of Florida, in bowing to the decision of Loving
v. Virginia,' decided by the United States Supreme Court, has invalidated
the inter-racial marriage laws6 of the State of Florida.7 Subsequently,
the Florida legislature repealed all of the statutes validating certain
marriages between whites and blacks and prohibiting marriages between
them as well as the statutes relating to cohabitation between the races.8
B. Common-Law Marriages
It is incumbent upon an alleged wife who is seeking temporary
alimony and child support from her common-law husband (in a marriage
contracted before January 1, 1968) to make a prima facie showing of
the existence of the common-law marriage; she does not have to prove
it conclusively at this stage.9
C. Annulment
An annulment should not be granted in the absence of clear and
unequivocal proof that cohabitation did not occur before the marriage.
The second district held that no annulment should be granted when the
wife testified that she entered into the ceremony to provide a name for her
unborn child conceived as a result of pre-marital intercourse between
the parties.'0 The court also held that there is no fraud if the alleged
wife informed her husband prior to the marriage ceremony that she
had no intention of having sexual relations with him "right away * * *
but * * * if my feelings did change, and when they did, I would certainly
let him know.""
III. DivoRcE
A. Jurisdiction and Venue
When alleged acts of cruelty have occurred in Leon County and in
Dade County, venue may be laid in either county; the trial court is
not required to weigh the amount of cruelty occurring in the different
counties in order to determine the proper forum.
5. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
6. FLA. STAT. § 741.11-741.16 (1967).
7. Van Hook v. Blanton, 206 So.2d 210 (Fla. 1968).
8. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-195, Repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 741.11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19,
20, 798.04, 798.05 (1967).
9. Phillips v. Phillips, 215 So.2d 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
10. Williams v. Williams, 214 So.2d 48 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
11. Id. at 50.
12. Bannerman v. Bannerman, 204 So.2d 234 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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B. Grounds for Divorce
The refusal of a wife to allow her serviceman husband to visit her
while he was on furlough and her refusal to allow him to see his child,
who had been born while he was absent, was held sufficient to constitute
cruelty.'3
A New York divorce decree which forbids one spouse from remar-
rying without order of the court entitles this spouse to obtain a divorce
in Florida based upon the New York decree in favor of the other
spouse.'4
Incurable insanity is now a ground for divorce; however, the insane
person must have been adjudged insane for a period of at least three
years, and two court-appointed medical doctors must certify to the
court that the defendant is "hopelessly and incurably insane." The Act
provides for procedural safeguards for the insane spouse and also re-
quires the sane spouse to provide for the care and maintenance of the
insane defendant.' 5
C. Defenses
One act of intercourse between the spouses subsequent to the filing
of a divorce complaint does not constitute condonation in the absence
of any testimony showing a freely exercised intent to forgive. The act
of intercourse might be the result of coercion or trickery, or it might
represent a conditional condonation with a later revival of the condi-
tionally condoned wrong; it is an equivocal act which has no legal effect
without explanation.' 6
It would not seem to be reversible error to grant a divorce to one
party even though the trial court finds that both parties have been
guilty of misconduct.'
D. Procedure
In a case of first impression, the Second District Court of Appeal
has held that a complaint for divorce which tracks the abbreviated
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure form 1.943 satisfies the requirements
of rule 1.110(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure."R
The Third District Court of Appeal has held that it is error for
a trial court to order a plaintiff husband in a divorce suit to answer
13. Peacock v. Peacock, 207 So.2d 292 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1968).
14. Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967), following FLA. STAT. § 65.04(8)
(1965).
15. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-142.
16. Albritton v. Albritton, 212 So.2d 817 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968). Cf. Glaum v. Glaum, 224
So.2d 390 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). Stanley v. Stanley, 201 So.2d 613 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967), has
reaffirmed the rule of condonation articulated in Seiferth v. Seiferth, 132 So.2d 471 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1961), and Pollak v. Pollak, 196 So.2d 771 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
17. Bornstein v. Bornstein, 215 So.2d 60 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
18. Muller v. Muller, 205 So.2d 558 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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his wife's depositions regarding his alleged adultery or to have his com-
plaint dismissed and to be precluded from defending against his wife's
counterclaim if he should fail to do so. 9 The decision was based upon
the United States Supreme Court cases of Spevack v. Klein20 (which
involved a lawyer who upon the grounds of self-incrimination refused
to produce financial records and refused to testify regarding his alleged
misconduct as a lawyer) and Garrity v. New Jersey2' (which involved
the threat of discharge to secure incriminatory evidence from a police-
man). The dissent pointed out that both of these cases involved persons
who were involuntary parties to judicial or quasi-judicial hearings while
in the instant case the husband was a voluntary party-plaintiff.
Because a court always has inherent control over its own decrees
before they become final and because the state is a party to every di-
vorce case, a chancellor who has dismissed a divorce case without prej-
udice after a statement by counsel for both parties that the parties had
reconciled may vacate the order of dismissal and reinstate the case for
further proceedings when the reconciliation proves to have been an
abortive venture. The court noted that there was no specific rule of
procedure which provided coverage of this problem.22
It is not error for the chancellor to permit the plaintiff to amend
a divorce complaint to seek alimony unconnected with divorce when
the extreme cruelty ground for both complaints is the same.2 3
It is not an abuse of discretion for a chancellor to refuse to allow
the plaintiff husband to amend his complaint for divorce from the
ground of cruelty to the ground of adultery at the conclusion of the
trial of the case when the husband knew of the fact of adultery when
the suit was filed and evidence of the adultery was introduced in sup-
port of the cruelty ground.2 4
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal has held that a husband who has testified to
confidential communications between himself and his wife in an oral
deposition prior to trial will be deemed to have waived his right to as-
sert the privileged communication when portions of the deposition are
introduced at the trial. Under rules 1.280(f) and 1.330(c)(1) of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the plea of privilege must be raised
at the time of the taking of the deposition. 5
The Second District Court of Appeal has articulated the view
that the Florida courts require only "slight corroboration with respect
to the grounds for divorce" in contested divorce actions. 26 The corrob-
19. Simkins v. Simkins, 219 So.2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
20. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
21. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
22. Danner v. Danner, 206 So.2d 650 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
23. Rouse v. Rouse, 212 So.2d 650 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
24. Wooten v. Wooten, 213 So.2d 292 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
25. Tibado v. Brees, 212 So.2d 61 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
26. Hillyard v. Hillyard, 212 So.2d 306, 308 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968). But see Clutter v.
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oration rule was designed to guard against collusion of the parties, and
when the action is strongly contested the reason for the rule does not
exist.
In a somewhat cryptic opinion, the Third District Court of Appeal
seemingly has held that it is error to charge costs of a divorce action
against an attorney rather than against his losing client.2
7
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal has held that when a husband's suit for divorce
for extreme cruelty was dismissed with prejudice the doctrine of res
judicata precludes the husband in a subsequent divorce action for ex-
treme cruelty from introducing testimony concerning events which oc-
curred prior to the first judgment .2  The court pointed out that this
decision would not prevent the husband from again filing suit for divorce
on the same grounds after he has lost the first action; he cannot, how-
ever, introduce testimony concerning events which transpired before
the first judgment but must limit the testimony to events occurring
thereafter.
E. Contempt Proceedings
A former husband who admits to the court that he lied (about the
place of residence of his wife and that he was sending money to her for
her support and the support of their children) in prior divorce proceedings
is guilty of direct criminal contempt and may be punished by the court
in subsequent proceedings without the necessity of a jury trial. The
court noted that the fact that the statute of limitations for the crime of
perjury had run would not bar the use of contempt proceedings by the
court.2"
F. Appeal of Divorce Judgments
If a divorced wife enters her appeal from a divorce decree subse-
quent to the death of her husband, the decree must be revived in the
trial court by making the representatives of the deceased husband a
party to the appeal. It should be noted that if the revivor occurs in the
trial court later than sixty days (now thirty days) after the appeal from
the original decree or judgment, the appeal will be dismissed. The First
District Court of Appeal, in light of these rules, has held that it would
not dismiss the appeal when no revivor was made in the trial court but
Clutter, 207 So.2d 499 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), cert. denied, 210 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1968), which
held that there was insufficient evidence of cruelty and insufficient corroboration of the
husband's testimony relating to the alleged cruelty of his wife to justify the granting of
a divorce. A perceptive reading of this case dramatically illustrates the futility inherent in
our present "fault" approach to divorce.
27. Thurman v. Thurman, 223 So.2d 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), citing FLA. STAT. § 57.041
(1967).
28. Telford v. Telford, 225 So.2d 165 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
29. Chavez-Rey v. Chavez-Rey, 213 So.2d 596 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
would relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court in order to give the ap-
pellant an opportunity to revive the divorce decree against the repre-
sentative of the deceased husband. 80
If the parties are living apart by virtue of a separate maintenance
decree of a foreign state and the husband subsequently sues for divorce
in Florida on the grounds of desertion and extreme cruelty and the
wife pleads res judicata to the charge of desertion but does not plead
res judicata or estoppel by judgment to the cruelty charge at the trial
level, she may not do so at the appellate level. 1
A wife who has accepted payment of $5,000 (as the return of a
"peace offering" which she gave the husband) and a payment of $450
which was her portion of the parties' joint bank account does not waive
her right to appeal on the grounds that the trial court was in error in
granting the divorce and in determining the amount of alimony. 2
IV. ALIMONY
A. Jurisdiction and Venue: Florida and Foreign Judgments
It is error to enter a divorce judgment ordering the payment of
alimony and child support when jurisdiction was obtained by construc-
tive service and neither jurisdiction in personam nor in rem was ob-
tained. 83
A court has no power to award alimony subsequent to the entry
of a divorce judgment which failed to provide alimony unless the judg-
ment provides that the court has reserved jurisdiction to award alimony
in the future. 4
A Pennsylvania alimony decree predicated upon constructive ser-
vice entered against a nonresident husband is not binding in Florida
and is subject to collateral attack when the wife seeks to enforce the
decree in Florida. Further, since she did not seek to make the foreign
decree a Florida judgment, she is not entitled to an award of attorney's
fees. 5 Under Sackler v. Sackler 3 a Florida court may award attorney's
fees when the former wife is seeking to establish and enforce the foreign
decree as a domestic decree.
Under section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes, the venue for proceed-
ings seeking the modification of the support provisions of a separation
agreement (or a divorce decree) may be laid in the circuit in which ei-
ther of the parties reside, and this statute controls the general venue
statute" which provides that the actions shall be brought only in the
30. Belvin v. Belvin, 202 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
31. Aufseher v. Aufseher, 217 So.2d 868 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
32. Rund v. Rund, 215 So.2d 763 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
33. Adams v. Adams, 218 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
34. DuVernoy v. DuVernoy, 202 So.2d 620 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
35. Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, 208 So.2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
36. 47 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1950).
37. FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (1967).
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county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued,
or where the property in litigation is located. Hence, a husband who
is seeking a modification of the support provisions of a foreign divorce
decree may institute the action in the county in which he resides rather
than in the county in which his former wife resides."8
B. Criteria for the Award
It is an abuse of discretion for a chancellor to award alimony of
$200 per month and child support of $100 per month for one child and
to order the wife to pay mortgage payments of $281.30 per month out
of the alimony payments when the uncontradicted testimony showed
that the husband for years prior to the divorce had given the wife $700
per month with which to make the mortgage payments and run the
home and he admitted at the trial that approximately $500 per month
would be necessary to maintain the home. The district court increased
the alimony award to $300 per month, affirmed the child support award,
and ordered the husband to pay the second mortgage payments of
$110.20 per month. 9 It is submitted that neither the trial court nor
the appellate court paid much attention to the uncontradicted testimony.
When the combined income of a husband and wife is small, the
chancellor has discretion to refuse to award alimony to the wife. In
addition, the chancellor's award of child support will not be reversed
when the award is within the proper exercise of his discretion, partic-
ularly if he reserves jurisdiction to modify the award in the future be-
cause of a possible change in circumstances.4 0
In making an alimony award it is error for the trial court to refuse
to consider amounts which a husband is to receive from the distribution
of his deceased mother's estate. The trial court judge should consider
these amounts but should also consider the federal and state tax liability
to be paid from the husband's share, the probability of claims being
filed against the estate, the probability of a probate contest, and other
factors which may reduce the net amount of the husband's inheritance.41
Even though the court finds that the needs of the wife include a
need to have an automobile supplied for her use by the husband, it is
error to order him to furnish a new car every three years. If the wife
is now supplied "with an adequate automobile"42 the court should re-
serve jurisdiction to determine a later need for a replacement car and
38. Stewart v. Carr, 218 So.2d 525 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
39. Farbman v. Farbman, 208 So.2d 648 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). See Preston v. Preston,
216 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), in which the Third District Court of Appeal increased
an alimony and child support award because of the high living standard of the family which
had been established by the husband-father. For a painstaking analysis of a couple's income
and expenses in determining alimony and child support, see Crocker v. Crocker, 222 So.2d
258 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
40. Baker v. Baker, 206 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
41. Schreiber v. Schreiber, 224 So.2d 407 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
42. Lyons v. Lyons, 208 So.2d 137, 139 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
1970]
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the kind and condition of a replacement car which may be required at
that later time. Under the doctrine of "necessities," a husband is not
liable for the debts of the wife incurred prior to separation nor is he
liable for the wife's income tax payments made after the separation of
the parties but prior to divorce. 3
When an award of alimony has been reversed because it is so in-
adequate as to shock the conscience of the court and the case has been
remanded for an increased award, the increased award must be made
retroactive from the date of the original award.,"
C. Lump Sum vis-a-vis Periodic Alimony
The Florida statute authorizing lump-sum alimony was enacted
in 1947. As a result, the third district court has held that the following
language in a 1938 divorce decree that the home of the parties:
be and the same is hereby awarded unto the plaintiff . . . for
her life time and upon her death the same shall go to the sur-
viving children of the parties hereto.
That the defendant (the husband) shall pay all taxes, insurance
assessments .. in and upon said home during the lifetime of
of said . . . (the wife), as long as she shall remain single . . .4
did not make the estate of the deceased former husband liable for these
payments because they could not be considered as lump-sum alimony
but as continuing alimony payments which terminate upon the death
of the former husband unless the husband has agreed to bind his estate
subsequent to his death.
Both lump-sum alimony and periodic alimony may be awarded
to a wife,46 but if a chancellor merely awards lump-sum alimony the
former wife will be unable subsequently to seek modification in the event
of a change of circumstances and be awarded periodic alimony unless
the court reserves jurisdiction to modify the ward in the future.47
In the event that lump-sum alimony is awarded to the wife and
she appeals and is awarded temporary alimony pending the appeal, the
amounts of temporary alimony which are paid should be deducted from
the lump-sum alimony award and the wife will be entitled to interest
from the day of judgment on the net amount of the lump-sum award. s
D. Insurance Premiums
It is error to order the husband to pay substantial annual premi-
ums on a life insurance policy which is owned by the wife and which
43. Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 224 So.2d 742 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
44. Massey v. Massey, 213 So.2d 260 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
45. Payne v. Payne, 201 So.2d 590, 591 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
46. Blume v. Blume, 203 So.2d 627 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
47. Gordon v. Gordon, 204 So.2d 734 (3d Dist. 1968), citing FLA. STAT. §§ 65.08, .16
(1967).
48. Frischkorn v. Frischkorn, 223 So.2d 380 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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names her as beneficiary when the decree refers to these premium pay-
ments as being "in addition" to lump-sum alimony. It would appear
that if the court had labeled these premium payments as constituting
alimony, the decree would be proper.49
It is proper for a chancellor to order a husband to furnish a major
medical insurance policy for the benefit of the divorced wife. "It would
have been appropriate to require the husband to pay major medical
expenses, and the furnishing of an insurance policy to cover these could
be a less expensive alternative."' 0
E. Modification and Termination of the Award
A trial court has the discretion to reduce the amount of payments
of temporary alimony in the future even though the defendant may be
in arrears at the time of the reduction.5'
The fact that the former wife has 'become substantially self-sup-
porting and that the husband has suffered a diminution in his earnings
since the entry of the divorce decree will justify the chancellor in order-
ing a reduction of alimony payments.52
A wife's rights to alimony terminate upon her marriage to another
even though the latter marriage is annulled on the grounds of fraud,
when the second marriage is voidable rather than void. If the second
marriage is bigamous, however, it is void and will not cut off her right
to alimony from the first husband.5"
A foreign state's alimony decree which is subject to retroactive
modification or cancellation of arrearages under the law of the rendering
state is not entitled to full faith and credit in Florida. It is presumed,
however, that the law of the state which entered the decree does not
permit the retroactive modification or cancellation, and the burden of
proof to the contrary rests upon the person contesting the foreign award
as the basis for a Florida judgment.54
The fact that a formerly unemployed former wife has now become
employed is not enough to justify a reduction or elimination of alimony
payments when the possibility of the wife's subsequent employment
was reasonably anticipated at the time of the original divorce decree
which set the amount of alimony. 5
A change in custody of a minor child from his mother to his father
and the consequent decrease in the husband's payments to the former
wife because of the elimination of child support will justify the chan-
cellor in ordering an increase in alimony payments in an amount which
49. Bildner v. Bildner, 219 So.2d 749 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
50. Lyons v. Lyons, 208 So.2d 137, 139 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
51. Burton v. Burton, 216 So.2d 480 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
52. Ludacer v. Ludacer, 211 So.2d 64 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
53. Compare Evans v. Evans, 212 So.2d 107 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968), with Reese v.
Reese, 192 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1966).
54. Harrington v. Harrington, 213 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
$5. Waller v. Waller, 212 So.24 352 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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is less than the former combined total of alimony and child support.
This is especially true when the husband's income has increased and
there is some controverted evidence reflecting upon the former wife's
physical condition and ability to work.5"
The Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that the transfer by
prior Florida Supreme Court decision,57 has held that the mere fact that
a former wife uses her alimony payments for alcohol and drugs which
has resulted in her being arrested at least fifty times is not sufficient to
justify a court in reducing the amount of alimony.58
It would appear that a trial court has the power to order a former
husband to deliver to his former wife copies of income tax returns filed
each year by him and his new wife (or in the alternative to deliver an
affidavit as to his gross income) over the objection that this constitutes
an invasion of privacy of the new wife.59
F. Enforcement of the Award
A Florida statute permits the garnishment of the salary of the head
of a family residing in Florida "to enforce the orders by the courts of
this state for alimony, suit money or support or other orders in actions
for divorce or alimony."6 The Third District Court of Appeals has
held that a " 'final decree' which, inter alia, reduced to judgment cer-
tain past-due sums which the former husband . . . owed his former
wife . . ."" did not come within the meaning of the above statute. It
is suggested that if the words "past-due sums" were meant to include
alimony or support payments to the ex-wife (the case does not clearly
state the source), then the court was indulging in semantic hocus-pocus
in distinguishing an "order" from a "judgment." If the past-due sums
were in the nature of a property settlement, then the decision may have
some basis.
Due process requires that reasonable notice should be given to a
husband when contempt charges have been brought against him for the
failure to pay alimony and child support. As a result, it is erroneous
for a chancellor to hold a former husband in contempt in response to
an oral request by his former wife, made at a hearing on his petition
to reduce the amount of payments."
In accordance with the Florida statutes,63 a municipality is subject
to garnishment against money owing to an employee in order to enforce
an alimony award entered against the employee.14
56. Coggan v. Coggan, 214 So.2d 368 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
57. Phillippi v. Phillippi, 148 Fla. 393, 4 So.2d 465 (1941).
58. Horner v. Homer, 222 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
59. Ramona v. Ramona, 223 So.2d 569 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
60. FLA. STAT. § 61.12 (1967).
61. Noyes v. Cooper, 216 So.2d 799, 800 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
62. Delves v. Delves, 213 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
63. FLA. STAT. § 61.12 (1967).
64. City of Jacksonville v. Jones, 213 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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A chancellor is justified in refusing to hold a husband in contempt
for his failure to maintain a medical insurance policy for his wife (in
accordance with the terms of a court-approved property-settlement
agreement) when the policy was cancelled by the insurance company
because of the wife's single status and the wife is now uninsurable be-
cause of a severe back complaint. Inasmuch as the husband in unable
to comply with the decree, he cannot be in contempt. Of course, the
former wife may now institute proceedings asking for an increase in
support payments because of her physical condition.65
The inaction of a former wife in waiting nine years to press a claim
for accrued alimony does not create an estoppel against her, and her
delay, without a change in position of her former husband to his detri-
ment in reliance on her inaction, does not amount to laches. 6
A trial court judge may within the proper exercise of his discretion
temporarily refuse to enter a judgment and order execution on arrearages
of alimony, even though he enters an order decreeing that the husband
is in arrears.6 7
G. Appeals of Judgments
A single assignment of error that the court erred in entering a final
judgment of divorce will be sufficient to support two separate points
on appeal dealing with the award of alimony. The court drew a distinc-
tion between equity and common law actions: in equitable actions
usually the only judicial act which the appellant can assign is the final
decree, while in common law actions many judicial acts occur which
may give rise to separate assignments of error."'
Rule 3.8(b) of the Florida Appellate Rules (which authorizes an
appellant wife to apply to the trial court for an award of alimony or
support money pending the appeal) is permissive and not mandatory;
a failure by the wife to comply with this rule will not result in the dis-
missal of her appeal if she has accepted payment of alimony or support
money from her husband pursuant to the trial court's decree from which
the appeal is taken. However, under the principle of estoppel, if the wife
has accepted payment and the husband is able to show that this accep-
tance has caused injury or prejudice to him, the appeal may be defeated.
Of course, if the husband is unable to show this harm and the facts in-
dicate that a dismissal of the appeal would cause harm and prejudice
to the wife, there is an additional reason for denying the defense of
estoppel by the husband.69
65. Wiener v. Wiener, 210 So.2d 721 (4th Dist. 1968). See Fisher v. Fisher, note 117,
infra, and accompanying text.
66. Compare Gottesman v. Gottesman, 202 So.2d 75 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967), with Brown
v. Brown, 108 So.2d 492 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
67. Gottesman v. Gottesman, 220 So.2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
68. Cohen v. Cohen, 217 So.2d 908 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
69. Schreiber v. Schreiber, 217 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1968), rev'g Schreiber v. Schreiber, 208
So.2d 681 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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V. PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Jurisdiction
The chancellor does not have jurisdiction to order a wife to join
in the execution of a mortgage on foreign real property even though the
purpose of the mortgage is to enable the husband to secure funds to
pay alimony to the wife.70
A court does not have jurisdiction over the real property of a non-
resident husband when the notice of publication for constructive service
fails to describe the property. 7'
B. Insurance
A property settlement which is entered into during the course of
divorce proceedings and which provides that the wife gives up all rights
or claims "then or theretofore existing" against the husband will not
bar the wife from taking as beneficiary under an insurance policy which
was applied for by the husband during the marriage but which was
issued by the insurance company after the divorce. 72
The "paramour presumption" received an interesting application
in Hill v. Hill.73 A husband left his wife and cohabitated with another
woman as husband and wife. The husband then designated the second
woman as his wife in a group life insurance policy of his employer. The
husband died and both "wives" claimed the proceeds of the policy. The
first wife asserted that there is a presumption of undue influence which
must be overcome before a paramour may recover the proceeds of the
insurance. The court stated that although there may be a presumption
of undue influence by a paramour when there is a change of beneficiary
and the paramour has the burden of proving an absence of undue in-
fluence, the instant case involved the initial designation of a beneficiary
as "a routine request at the place of employment."74 As a result, the
court stated that the bare presumption of undue influence by the par-
amour is not sufficient "to overcome the routine act, common in every-
day experience, of designating a beneficiary of life insurance provided
through the insured's employer on a group basis. Our holding is no
broader than that. '75
70. Burton v. Burton, 216 So.2d 480 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
71. Nethery v. Nethery, 212 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
72. Compare Raggio v. Richardson, 218 So.2d 501 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), with Beatty v.
Strickland, 136 Fla. 330, 186 So. 542 (1939), and Benner v. Pedersen, 143 So.2d 722 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1962).
73. 222 So.2d 454, 455 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). Compare with Beatty v. Strickland, 136
Fla. 330, 186 So. 542 (1939), and Benner v. Pedersen, 143 So.2d 722 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
74. 222 So.2d at 455.
75. Id.
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C. Estates by the Entirety
A conveyance of real property to a husband and wife presumably
creates a tenancy by the entirety, and this presumption may not be
rebutted by the testimony of one of the spouses after the death of the
other.78
When a car title is registered in the name of "J.L. Fischer or Susann
G. Fischer" (husband and wife, but this is not indicated) and the hus-
band trades in the car to a car dealer without the joinder of the wife,
the court may use extrinsic evidence (e.g., joint funds used to purchase
the car, joint lien on the vehicle, joint use, etc.) to determine that the
car was actually held as an estate by the entirety. The wife, therefore,
had the right to replevin the car from the car dealer when the trade-in
purchase-sale was not consummated. The opinion seems to indicate that
the dealer is put on notice in a case of this type that the parties may be
married and that he ought to make inquiry about the marital status
before he accepts the car. The court noted that some jurisdictions have
held that the use of the disjunctive "or" prevents the formation of an
estate by the entirety; it is a pity that the Florida court did not follow
this other view.7
The Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that the transfer by
a husband to his wife of his interest in a tenancy by the entirety in
Maryland property pursuant to the parties' agreement as "security" for
their reconciliation will be upheld in favor of the wife when divorce
proceedings are subsequently brought. The original resumption of mar-
ital relations is sufficient consideration for the transfer of the property
interest.78
Tenants by the entirety become tenants in common upon divorce,
and as tenants in common each tenant has the duty to pay one-half of
the mortgage encumbering the property. Hence, it is error for the chan-
cellor to order the divorced wife to pay the entire monthly mortgage
payments and then to give her credit for only one-half of the reduction
of the principal of the mortgage as a result of these payments. 79 On
the other hand, it is not erroneous for the judgment to require the former
wife to pay taxes, insurance, upkeep, and utility charges and to make
the mortgage payments, when the same judgment divides certain funds
of the parties and places one-half into a trust account for the payment
of the above items.80
There is no presumption that a wife intended to make a gift to
her husband, and the burden is on him to prove that a gift was made
76. Losey v. Losey, 221 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1969).
77. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc. v. Fischer, 217 So.2d 355 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
78. Fuller v. Fuller, 215 So.2d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
79. Lyons v. Lyons, 208 So.2d 137 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). Accord, Tillman v. Tillman,
222 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
80. Harris v. Harris, 224 So.2d 368 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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when she used her funds to purchase property taken as an estate by
the entirety.8
A wife who advances her personal funds to pay the entire purchase
price of real property taken as an estate by the entirety with her husband
has a special equity in the property "or the transaction may be construed
a loan between the parties"'82 in the event of a subsequent divorce.
Based upon the quoted words, the Second District Court of Appeals or-
dered the trial court to find a "special equity or loan in favor of the
wife to the extent of $6,888.00 [the amount she advanced], plus interest,
from the date of advancement."83 It should be noted that the property in
question was sold and the husband received $22,500. It would appear that
the award to the wife of $6,888 plus interest at the rate of six percent per
annum from the date of the purchase (August, 1959) gives the wife
much less than if the court had awarded her $22,500-the amount the
husband received from the sale.
It is well established law in Florida that when a husband purchases
property and the deed is taken in both his and his wife's name, there
is a presumption that the husband intended to make a gift to his wife.
The Second District Court of Appeal has held that this presumption is
not the usual presumption which may be rebutted by a preponderance of
evidence to the contrary; the husband is required to prove "his lack of
donative intent beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
' 84
Some of the dangers inherent in the election of remedies concept
were illustrated in the unusual case of Black v. Miller.', Mrs. Black
secured a divorce from her husband and the final decree awarded child
support, alimony, and exclusive possession of the family home held as
an estate by the entirety. Subsequently, the trial court granted Mrs.
Black a lien on the husband's one-half of the property as security for
past due amounts and all amounts to come due. The court also entered
a judgment for the arrearages. An execution sale was conducted on the
judgment and Miller purchased at the sale. A few months later, the
court gave Mrs. Black two more judgments for the arrearages. Miller
then brought suits for partition and the court held that Miller (who
was an attorney who had examined the divorce file) took subject to Mrs.
Black's right to continued possession of the home pursuant to the original
divorce decree, and he had no right to partition. His purchase at the
execution sale, however, gave him all of the title of Mr. Black, and
therefore the judgments given Mrs. Black after the sale could not attach
to Miller's prior-acquired interest under the theory that Mrs. Black by
electing to execute on the judgment had given up her lien on her hus-
81. Mays v. Mays, 203 So.2d 674 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
82. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 202 So.2d 822, 823 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
83. Id.
84. Schoenrock v. Schoenrock, 202 So.2d 571 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
85. 219 So.2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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band's one-half interest. If Mrs. Black had elected to wait each time
the husband was in arrears in his payments and had foreclosed on her
security lien for these arrears in equity rather than in law, she would
have preserved the lien and gradually wiped out her husband's title
and taken complete ownership in her own name.
Although neither spouse may individually contract so as to affect the
title of homestead property held as an estate by the entirety, a husband
who individually contracts in writing with a realtor for the sale of home-
stead-entirety property is liable to the realtor for the agreed commission
in the event of a sale of the property. 6
D. Partition
The Second District Court of Appeal has held that a pre-trial
conference is a "hearing" and, as a result, a party may orally move the
court to enter an order providing that the former husband in a partition
suit grant access to an appraiser to appraise property held as an estate
in common by the parties. Of course, the oral motion and the ruling of
the court must be reduced to writing.87
In Bailey v. Stewart8 a court-approved settlement provided that
a husband's father should have a lien upon one-fourth of the proceeds
of the marital home in the event of sale; the agreement did not spell out
that the wife was to sell or attempt to sell the home. As a result, it was
held that the court could not imply from the agreement that the property
was to be sold, and there was no duty to sell.
It is not proper for the chancellor to award title to the wife of
property formerly owned as an estate by the entirety in the absence
of any pleadings asking for this kind of an award;8s9 and in the absence
of appropriate pleadings or the agreement of the parties, it is error for
the chancellor to decree a partition of an estate by the entirety during
the divorce proceedings. °
In the absence of pleadings before the trial court which ask for
a partition of real property or the partition of the proceeds from real
property, it is error for the chancellor to award the wife one-half of the
rental proceeds of property which is held as a tenancy in common by
the spouses. 91 Upon proper application by the ex-wife, however, a court
does have jurisdiction to modify its decree (which granted the ex-wife
possession of the marital home) to permit her to lease the property and
to use the proceeds as support for herself and the children when the
court also reduces the amount of monthly payments to be made by the
husband. It should be noted that the court is not affecting the title to
86. Keyes Company v. Moscarella, 223 So.2d 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
87. Coggan v. Coggan, 213 So.2d 902 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
88. 213 So.2d 442 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
89. Pearson v. Pearson, 213 So.2d 304 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
90. Goodstein v. Goodstein, 212 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
91. Holton v. Holton, 216 So.2d 35 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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the property but is merely acting incident to its power over questions
dealing with child support and alimony.
92
E. Resulting Trusts
A resulting trust (which can be reached by a wife in a divorce ac-
tion) is not created by the fact that a man has conveyed real property
to his relatives years prior to his marriage and has then continued to
manage and enjoy the profits from the property subsequent to his mar-
riage in the absence of any proof of fraud. 3
F. Bequests and Divorce
A bequest to a spouse is invalidated by a Florida statute when the
parties are divorced subsequent to the execution of the will,94 and the
bequest is not renewed by the subsequent remarriage of the spouses? 5
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Jurisdiction
It is permissible for a trial court judge to enter a decree of divorce
and to provide in the decree that he retains jurisdiction to award at-
torney's fees at a later time.9 6
B. Rights to an Award
In a four-to-three opinion the Florida Supreme Court, in reversing
the Third District Court of Appeal, has held that there is no statutory
basis in Florida for a court to award attorney's fees to a wife who has
successfully invalidated her husband's Mexican divorce decree in a
Florida declaratory decree action. 7
It is permissible for a court to award attorney's fees to a former
wife when the ex-husband moves to modify custody provisions of a for-
mer decree, she responds by moving for additional modifications of the
custody provisions and to allow her to rent the marital home and use
the proceeds for child support, and the court merges both motions into
one proceeding upon the basis that she was defending the original final
decree. In light of this decision, it would seem wise for attorneys for
ex-husbands to insist that each motion be treated separately and to re-
sist any attempt to "merge" the motions.9 '
92. Thompson v. Thompson, 223 So.2d 95 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
93. Mordue v. Case, 201 So.2d 844 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
94. FLA. STAT. § 731.101 (1967).
95. In re Estate of Guess, 213 So.2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
96. Hunter v. Hunter, 221 So.2d 189 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
97. Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1968), rev'g Kittel v. Kittel, 194 So.2d 640 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1967), construing FLA. STAT. § 65.16(1) (1965).
98. Thompson v. Thompson, 223 So.2d 95 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), applying FLA. STAT,
§ 61.15 (1967).
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Under section 61.15 of the Florida Statutes (which deals with
attorney's fees for a former wife who is seeking enforcement of an al-
imony or child-support order or who is resisting modification of such
order), the ex-wife should not be denied an allowance for attorney's fees
"except for sufficient circumstances or equitable considerations which
are found and recited or otherwise made to appear in the order of the
court." 99
C. Criteria for the Award
In spite of the chancellor's experience and familiarity with the case,
he must base an award of attorney's fees on expert testimony rather
than on this experience and familiarity.Y0
The Third District Court of Appeal has refused to disturb an
award of $15,000 as attorney's fees for a wife who admitted marital
indiscretions early in the trial of the case and who occasioned a large
part of the lengthy trial by allegedly false defenses.'
D. Attorney's Fees Are Not Costs
The Third District Court of Appeal has held that attorney's fees
awarded to a defendant wife in a divorce action are not part of the
"costs" which the husband-plaintiff must pay or assign as error and
supersede within the intent of Rule 3.2(f) of the Florida Appellate
Rules; therefore, the amount of any attorney's fees should not be con-
sidered by the trial court when setting the amount of the supersedeas
bond.' 2
E. Interest on the Award
Interest accrues on a conditional remittitur of attorneys' fees from
the date of the original award; however, when the appellate court fixes
a new award in lieu of the original trial court award (rather than order-
ing a remittitur of the award), then interest accrues from the date of
the appellate award. 03
VII. ANTENUPTIAL AND POST-NUPTIAL
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
A. Antenuptial Agreements
The efficacy, if not the validity, of alimony provisions of antenuptial
agreements has been placed in grave doubt by the third district.' Judge
99. Gottesman v. Gottesman, 220 So.2d 640, 643 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
100. Ortiz v. Ortiz, 211 So.2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
101. Silberman v. Katcher, 214 So.2d 726 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
102. Ortiz v. Ortiz, 208 So.2d 857 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
103. Novack v. Novack, 210 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1968), rev'g Novak v. Novak, 203 So.2d'187
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
104. Posner v. Posner, 206 So.2d 416 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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Hendry for the majority stated that the alimony provisions of an ante-
nuptial agreement are not binding upon the chancellor who should exer-
cise his sound judicial discretion in fixing the amount of alimony. 105
Judge Carroll, concurring specially, was of the view that antenuptial
agreements which purport to set the amount of alimony in the event
of a divorce are contrary to public policy and are therefore void.'0 6
Judge Swann, dissenting, was of the view that the alimony provisions
of an antenuptial agreement should be binding upon the court when it
has been entered into freely and voluntarily, without duress, trickery,
over-reaching, concealment, or coercion. 1 7 The author is of the view
that Judge Swann's opinion clearly demonstrates the fallacy of the other
opinions expressed by the court.
An unusual factual and legal problem was presented in O'Shea v.
O'Shea.108 A sixty-six year old wife divorced her thirty-six year old
husband, and subsequently she wished to remarry him. The ex-husband
agreed to remarriage upon the condition that she would make him joint
owner of certain property in return for which he would leave his northern
employment and seek work in Florida. This agreement was entirely oral,
but both parties performed. Subsequently, the wife again sued for di-
vorce, and the trial court ordered the husband to give back his one-half
interest in the jointly held property. The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal reversed, holding that an oral antenuptial agreement which has been
performed by both parties is enforceable; or, aside from the contractual
aspect of the agreement, the husband is entitled to keep one-half of
the property upon the basis that the wife had made a gift of the property
to him.
When an antenuptial agreement provided that the wife was to re-
ceive $150,000 from the estate of her husband if she survived him and
then the will of the husband bequeathed $250,000 to her and provided
that if she contested the will or the antenuptial agreement she was to
receive only the $150,000 rather than the bequest, it is proper to construe
the antenuptial agreement as a promise to make a will. The will therefore
superseded the antenuptial contract, with the result that the widow
could not take under the contract as well as under the will-she was
limited to the bequest.1 9
B. Post-Nuptial Agreements
1. JURISDICTION
The Florida courts have jurisdiction to review and adjudicate the
reasonableness of a separation agreement entered into in a foreign state
105. Id. at 416-18.
106. Id. at 418-19 (concurring opinion).
107. Id. at 419-22 (dissenting opinion).
108. 221 So.2d 223 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
109. Sharps v. Sharps, 219 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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when the agreement has never been reviewed by any court and to modify
it upon a sufficient showing of a change of circumstances of the parties
occurring since the agreement was entered into."'
In a case of first impression in Florida, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal has held that the county judge's court has jurisdiction to
determine whether a post-nuptial agreement precludes a surviving hus-
band from contesting the probate of his deceased wife's will. The court
was careful to note that if the matter involved the boundaries or title
to real estate, homesteads, or disputes cognizable in equity (e.g., can-
cellation, reformation) then the circuit court would have jurisdiction."'
2. CONSTRUCTION OF AGREEMENTS
A property-settlement agreement (approved by a divorce decree)
which provided that the parties had agreed upon a settlement "of all
of their respective financial and property rights . ..,"" and that "any
and all property ... has been segregated and divided between the parties
hereto, and each of the parties hereto represents and admits that each
of them has in his or her possession his or her rightful property""' 3 has
been construed as covering United States Savings Bonds, even though
the agreement did not mention these bonds. As a result, bonds which
were in the possession of the husband at the time of his death, some of
which were registered in the name of the husband or the wife and others
which were payable on death to the wife, were held to be the sole prop-
erty of the husband.
In Northup v. Northup 14 the court construed the following language
as being ambiguous: "The husband hereby agrees that he shall be re-
sponsible for and pay all and any medical or dental bills in excess of
$25 incurred for services rendered to their minor sons." The court then
held that in the event any single medical or dental bill for any one month
exceeded $25, the husband would be liable for the entire amount and
not just for the excess over and above the $25. When a court seems
fired with a zeal to find an ambiguity, it will find one.
A property-settlement agreement which recites that its purpose is
to provide for a division of the joint properties of the spouses as well
as for the support and maintenance of the wife, but which contains no
provision that the property given to the wife is to be in lieu of or as
110. Cordrey v. Cordrey, 206 So.2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
111. In re Estate of White, 212 So.2d 324 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
112. Meer v. Garvey, 212 So.2d 97, 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
113. Id. at 98.
114. 217 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). See Walter v. Walter, 208 So.2d 498 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1968), for a questionable construction of a separation agreement which provided
that alimony payments were to be based upon "the last filed United States income tax" re-
turn. Does this mean that the husband must pay alimony during the year in which it was
payable or during the following year based upon the "last filed" return? The court held the
former, with Justice Reed dissenting.
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consideration for a waiver of the right to alimony, does not bar the wife
from seeking alimony in a separate-maintenance proceeding."'
A former wife has no claim for alimony payments accruing after the
death of her former husband unless there is an agreement clearly evi-
dencing the intention of the husband to bind his estate to continue to
make payments subsequent to his death. An agreement between the
spouses providing that "alimony will cease upon the death or remarriage
of""' the wife does not clearly evidence the husband's intention to bind
his estate.
3. MODIFICATION
When a husband has agreed (in a property-settlement agreement)
to make his wife an irrevocable beneficiary of his group health insurance
policy or to purchase substitute insurance if the original health policy
could not be maintained because of the divorce of the parties, and the
husband is unable to purchase substitute insurance because of the phy-
sical condition of the wife, the wife may petition under section 65.15
of the Florida Statutes that her former husband now be held responsible
for her medical expenses.117
Periodic payments which a husband agrees to make to his wife
pursuant to a property-settlement agreement in consideration for her
relinquishing her interests in property are not "alimony" payments but
in reality monetary incidents to a property-settlement agreement. Hence,
these "periodic payments are not subject to modification nor may en-
forcement of these payments be made by means of the contempt power
of the court, even though the parties have described these payments as
'alimony.' " In each case, the courts must determine whether the pay-
ments are in fact alimony or merely payments made in furtherance of
the parties' agreement in splitting up the property rights between them." 8
When a wife has accepted the benefits of a property-settlement
agreement for a period in excess of two years, it is proper to hold that
she is estopped to seek an increase in alimony payments." 9
A wife who relinquishes all claims for alimony in a property-settle-
ment agreement (which has been approved by the court) may not sub-
sequently ask the trial court to modify the agreement and grant her
alimony under section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes. 2
It would appear that after an ex-wife has accepted the benefits of
a property-settlement agreement she may not set it aside unless she
offers to return the parties to the status quo.'2 '
115. Campbell v. Campbell, 220 So.2d 920 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
116. Farrar v. Keyser, 212 So.2d 677, 678 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
117. Fisher v. Fisher, 202 So.2d 868 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
118. Howell v. Howell, 207 So.2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
119. Gillotte v. Gillotte, 212 So.2d 657 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
120. McKenna v. McKenna, 220 So.2d 433 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
121. Markham v. Markham, 222 So.2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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VIII. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
The case of Hubble v. Hubble'22 presents a troublesome procedural
point. The wife brought suit for divorce, and she asked for custody and
support of the couple's four children. The chancellor dismissed the suit
with prejudice; however, on petition for rehearing, the chancellor mod-
ified the decree to the extent that it would not operate to preclude the
allowance of further proceedings for the support of the wife and children
should the defendant father fail to continue support of the children "as
he is now doing .... ,13 The father was contributing $50 per week for
the support of the wife and children out of his weekly earnings of $250.
The First District Court of Appeal held that this award "is inequitable,
unrealistic and constitutes an abuse of discretion."' 24 The court then
remanded the case to the trial court "to fix a more adequate amount
for the support of the plaintiff and children, as he may determine, taking
additional testimony, if he sees fit.' 25 Query: is it proper for the appel-
late court to direct the trial court to fix the amount of child support in
the absence of a complaint filed pursuant to section 61.09 of the Florida
Statutes asking for alimony unconnected with divorce? Admittedly, a
prayer for general relief in a divorce complaint gives the chancellor con-
siderable latitude, but does it allow him to reshape the case without any
attention to the rules of procedure?
A wife does not have a right to an adjudication of alimony and
child support under section 61.09 of the Florida Statutes (alimony un-
connected with divorce) when she has grounds for divorce and the hus-
band is in fact supporting her and their children within his ability to
do so.126
In a suit for alimony unconnected with divorce on the grounds of
cruelty, the wife must allege and prove her grounds to the same extent as
if she were suing for divorce, and a divorce may not be granted upon un-
corroborated testimony of the plaintiff. Further, when the only corrobo-
rated act of cruelty occurred three years prior to the separation this is
insufficient corroboration of the wife's cause of action. 27
An alleged wife is not entitled to separate maintenance when it is
shown that her husband secured a valid foreign divorce from her; how-
ever, she may be entitled to alimony under the provisions of section
61.08 of the Florida Statutes. 28
An unusual application of the contempt power was displayed in
Friedman v. Friedman.29 A final judgment of separate maintenance re-
122. 214 So.2d 896, 897 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
123. Id. at 897.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Feldhusen v. Feldhusen, 214 So.2d 772 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
127. Barco v. Barco, 221 So.2d 22 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
128. Brandt v. Brandt, 217 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
129. 224 So.2d 424 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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strained each of the parties "from interfering, molesting or threatening
the other."'8 ° Subsequently, the wife moved the court to hold the husband
in contempt upon the grounds that he had instituted Mexican divorce
proceedings against her and that this constituted a violation of the above
restriction. The trial court then enjoined the continuance of the Mexican
proceedings, and no appeal was taken from this order. Still later, evidence
was introduced showing that the Mexican decree had been granted and
that the husband had remarried. The trial court then held the husband
in contempt. The Third District Court of Appeal held that the Mexican
proceedings did not constitute a violation of the restrictions contained
in the original decree and it was erroneous to enjoin the husband (upon
these facts) from continuing with the Mexican action. Even though the
original injunction was erroneous, however, it was not void and must
be obeyed; the court affirmed the contempt order.
IX. CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
A. Custody
1. JURISDICTION
New York does not have jurisdiction to award custody of a child
in a divorce action if the child was not within the state during the pen-
dency of the action. As a result, the decree is not entitled to recognition
in Florida in subsequent proceedings involving the custody of the child.'
When the children of the marriage are residing within the State of
Florida, constructive service of process may be used to obtain jurisdiction
over the husband; however, if the complaint fails to allege that the
children are residing in Florida, then the court does not have jurisdiction
over the children and constructive service against the husband would
be ineffective to give the court jurisdiction. The key is jurisdiction over
the resident children.8
A court has no jurisdiction to initially adjudicate the custody of
a minor child who is not physically present in the state even though per-
sonal service is made upon the defendant and even though both spouses
are residents of Florida.188
2. VENUE
When children are temporarily in the custody of their father in one
county, the father may institute proceedings in his own county over the
protest of the mother that the proper venue of the action is where she
resides. Venue is proper in the father's county on the basis that the chil-
130. Id. at 425.
131. Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
132. Rich v. Rich, 214 So.2d 777 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
133. Nieburger v. Nieburger, 214 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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dren are the subject matter of the case and they are physically present
in the county where the father resides.'
3. DIVIDED CUSTODY
The Second District Court of Appeal has upheld a custody order
providing that the father should have custody of his young twin daughters
four days one week and three days the next week alternating with the
mother."' Whatever happened to the rule forbidding divided custody of
children?
4. MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY AWARDS
It is error for the trial court to modify the custody provisions of a
divorce decree by taking custody from the mother and granting it to the
father when both parties are fit to have custody and the only apparent
reason for the change is a substantial increase in the father's income since
the entry of the original custody decree. 3 '
A custody decree of a foreign jurisdiction may be modified in Florida
only upon a showing that there has been a material change in conditions
since the rendition of the decree or that there were material facts which
were not presented to the foreign court and that modification would be
in the best interests of the children."7
The fact that a wife is in contempt of court because of her harassing
her former husband in spite of an injunction by the court to refrain from
this conduct is not sufficient, in itself, to justify the court in changing the
custody of the children of the marriage in the absence of proof that this
conduct was detrimental to the welfare of the children of the marriage."'
A former wife who shows that she has regained her physical and
mental health since the divorce decree, that she is employed and has
purchased a house, and that her former husband since the divorce decree
has been working in a distant city and has been forced to leave the
children with a baby-sitter during the workweek, has shown a substantial
change of circumstances which would justify a decree removing custody
of minor children from the former husband and awarding them to her."39
In the normal case, it is proper for a court to award custody of
children to the father after the death of their mother to whom custody had
previously been awarded. Custody may be granted, however, to the
brother and sister-in-law of the deceased mother when it is in the best
interests of the children to do so.' 4 °
134. Dones v. Green, 212 So.2d 919 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
135. Lindgren v. Lindgren, 220 So.2d 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
136. Hutchins v. Hutchins, 220 So.2d 438 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
137. Brownlow v. Earthman, 220 So.2d 28 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
138. Doran v. Doran, 212 So.2d 100 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
139. Smith v. Smith, 212 So.2d 117 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
140. DeGroot v. Fuller, 210 So.2d 244 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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When custody of a minor boy has been given to his mother, a court
will not ordinarily be justified in taking the custody of the child from his
mother and giving it to the father unless the mother has become unfit to
retain custody. However, when the minor son has expressed a decided
preference in favor of his father who is a practicing psychiatrist, able to
offer proper guidance to his son who is suffering an emotional disturbance,
the court may modify the custody award and grant custody to the father
in the best interests of the child.' 4 '
The court which has entered a divorce decree providing for custody
and support of children has continuing jurisdiction over the child custody
facet of the case in the event that the mother later institutes divorce
proceedings alleging that she subsequently entered into a common law
remarriage with her first husband, and the court determines that she is not
married. As a result, the court may not modify the custody provisions of
the original decree unless there is a showing of a substantial change of
conditions occurring since the entry of the original decree. 42
A court may modify a prior custody award because of a material
change in circumstances occurring since the original decree or because
the court has subsequently learned of material facts which were unknown
to it at the time of the original decree and "then only when it is shown to
be essential to the welfare of the child.''143
Even though a mother has been deprived of the custody of her
children in a post-divorce decree because of her unfitness, she may sub-
sequently show that she is now fit and be awarded custody of her young
children even though her former husband also is a fit parent.144 It is to be
wondered what effect four changes of custody will have on two girls ages
five and six.
5. RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS
A chancellor may, in the proper exercise of his discretion, order
that a minor child may not be removed from the state of Florida for a
period in excess of six weeks. 45
B. Support
1. JURISDICTION
The chancellor does not have jurisdiction to order a divorced husband
to redeposit funds in a bank creating a trust for the education of minor
141. Nixon v. Nixon, 209 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), aff'd on rehearing, 209 So.2d
878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
142. Frye v. Frye, 205 So.2d 310 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
143. Klein v. Klein, 204 So.2d 239, 241 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) (emphasis of the court).
144. Hoffman v. Linley, 201 So.2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
145. Adams v. Adams, 207 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968). For two cases dealing with the
requirement that children be kept within a certain geographical area, see Albritton v.
Carraway, 215 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968) and Martin v. Martin, 215 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1968).
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children six months after the entry of the divorce decree, even though the
decree retained jurisdiction " 'of further orders pertaining to child
custody and support.' ,M46
2. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A former wife is not collaterally estopped to seek support for a child
born subsequent to a divorce decree when the issue of paternity was
placed in issue during the divorce action but the judge failed to decide
the issue. 1'
3. CRITERIA FOR THE AWARD
A wife may waive any claim for alimony; however, if she also waives
child support, her waiver may be disregarded by the court in the in-
terests of the child, and a support award may be granted.' 48
It is error for a chancellor to award child support payments (and
other payments for mortgage debts) in an amount which exceeds the
father's monthly income by $216. It is also improper for the chancellor
to consider the fact that the husband has a potential interest in his
father's living trust when the amount of the trust is not shown in the
record. The record does not show that there is any real likelihood that
this interest will materialize into income to the former husband when he
has not received any income for a six-year period since the establishment
of the trust.'49
When a father in his complaint for divorce prays that he be ordered
to pay $750 per month alimony and child support and that he be ordered
to pay for the medical care of the children, to purchase clothes for them,
and to create an educational fund for them providing his financial position
improves, and that he be required to pay the taxes on the homestead of
the parties, it is error for the chancellor to order the father to do much
less than he has requested.15°
4. STEPFATHERS' NONLIABILITY FOR SUPPORT
A stepfather who has supported his stepchildren from the time of his
marriage to the death of the mother has no obligation to support them
after her death unless he has legally adopted them. As a result, when a
stepfather has recovered for the wrongful death of his wife the step-
children have no cause of action against him for a share of the recovery
obtained from the tort-feasor.' 5'
146. Ellis v. Ellis, 207 So.2d 57, 58 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1968).
147. Wacaster v. Wacaster, 220 So.2d 914 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
148. Kirkconnell v. Kirkconnell, 222 So.2d 441 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
149. Traylor v. Traylor, 214 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
150. Massey v. Massey, 205 So.2d 1 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
151. Fussell v. Douberly, 206 So.2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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5. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT LAW
A chancellor should not deny relief to a wife who has brought
proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law
to compel her former husband to support their minor children simply be-
cause the former wife has failed to abide by a prior court order which
ordered her to return the children to Florida from a foreign state. The
actions of the mother should not be extended to the children. 152
6. MOTHER'S TRAVEL COSTS AS "SUIT MONEY"
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the Third District
Court of Appeal has held that it is proper for a trial court to award a
former wife travel money for coming to Miami from New Jersey in order
to defend a suit for modification of custody of a child. The travel money
was found to come within the meaning of "suit money" as provided for
in section 61.15 of the Florida Statutes. 5 '
7. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR NONSUPPORT
A Florida statute makes it a criminal offense for "[a] ny man ... in
this state [to] desert his wife and children ... ."'" This statute is not
violated when a nonresident of Florida withholds support of his wife and
children who are residents of Florida-the statute requires the presence
of the defendant and his family in this state. 5'
8. MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT AWARD
Under section 65.14 of the Florida Statutes and the inherent powers
of a court of equity, the chancellor has the power to modify a child-sup-
port award because of a later change in circumstances even though the
original award was based upon a court approved stipulation of the
parties. The stipulation may bind the parties vis-A-vis each other, but it
cannot tie the hands of the court with relationship to the children. 5
The Third District Court of Appeal has held that it is proper for a
chancellor to reduce the amount of child-support payments upon the
remarriage of the wife and to order the father to pay part of the former
child-support payments into a trust fund (with a bank as trustee) for his
children.' 57
When the support provisions of a divorce decree have awarded
$500 per month for the support of two minor children and one of the
children has reached his majority, it is within the discretion of the
152. Hill v. Hill, 204 So.2d 346 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
153. Foster v. Foster, 220 So.2d 447 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
154. FLA. STAT. § 856.04 (1967).
155. State v. Darnell, 217 So.2d 127 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), rev'd, 230 So.2d 151 (Fla.
1970).
156. Sirkin v. Sirkin, 204 So.2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
157. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 201 So.2d 615 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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chancellor to reduce the support award to $300 per month for the
remaining minor child upon the petition of the father. The mother may
petition for an increase in this amount if she can show increasing needs
arising subsequent to the date of the original final decree of divorce.'15 8
In a petition for modification of a child-support award necessitated
by the requirement that the child needs special schooling because of a
physical defect, the court may only make the modification retroactive to
the date of the filing of the petition. Hence, the court may not order the
husband to pay for school tuition incurred prior to the date of the filing
of the petition for modification.1 9
An increase in child-support payments should not be granted merely
upon the mother's showing of a change in her financial assets occurring
since the original support order; she must also show either a change in
the ability of the father to pay or an increase in the needs of the children
for support. °
X. ADOPTION
When adoption proceedings are instituted in one county by the
stepfather and natural mother and then separate proceedings for adoption
are instituted in another county by the maternal grandparents, the court
of the first county has jurisdiction, and the court of the second should
dismiss the proceedings upon proper motion.""'
Although evidence may be insufficient to show that a father has
abandoned his child, it may be enough to show a high degree of indiffer-
ence to the child's welfare so as to place him in a poor position to object
to the child's adoption by her stepfather. The law will not hesitate to
sever the relationship when the best interest of the child so requires. 162
It would appear that a father can be deemed to have constructively
abandoned his child because the father has been incarcerated in a mental
institution, and a court can then enter an order of adoption of the child
when it is in the best interest of the child to do so.'
When a minor child has been permanently committed to the care of
the State Department of Welfare which has placed the child with
foster parents under an agreement that the foster parents will not seek
adoption of the child, the foster parents may seek the adoption despite the
agreement, and the refusal of the Department to give its consent will not
prevent the court from entering a decree of adoption. 64
158. Witlin v. Witlin, 206 So.2d 275 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
159. Alterman v. Alterman, 208 So.2d 472 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). For a case requiring
the husband to pay for special schooling for one child and psycho-therapy for another, see
Gregory v. Gregory, 208 So.2d 483 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
160. Andary v. Andary, 220 So.2d 687 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
161. Hogan v. Millican, 209 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
162. In re Adoption of Vincent, 219 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
163. Smith v. Lyst, 212 So.2d 921 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
164. In re Alexander, 206 So.2d 452 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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XI. JUVENILE COURTS AND JUVENILES
A. Custody Awards
In a somewhat equivocal opinion, the Second District Court of Ap-
peal has frowned upon an order of a juvenile court which awarded
custody of five minor children to their maternal grandmother and
permitted her to remove the children to England upon her posting of a
surety bond to insure that they would be returned to the jurisdiction of
the court upon any further proceedings instituted by the father."6 5
B. Support Awards
The juvenile court has the power to order an ex-husband to sup-
port a child conceived during wedlock without any necessity for the
court to find that the ex-husband is the father of the child in response to
his allegation that the child is not his. The court stated that the alleged
father may subsequently institute proceedings in a court of competent
jurisdiction to overcome the presumption that the child is his. 6 '
An order of commitment of minor children to care of foster parents
may require the natural parents of the children to pay for the amount
of this care.6 7
C. Criminal and Delinquency Proceedings
1. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
The Supreme Court of Florida, in reversing the Third District Court
of Appeal, has held that In re Gault1 68 (which held that a juvenile is
.entitled to the assistance of counsel in delinquency hearings) does not
apply retroactively to a waiver of jurisdiction hearing in a Florida juvenile
court dealing with the transfer of a juvenile to the jurisdiction of the
criminal court. 69
Prior to this decision; the Fourth District Court of Appeal had
already held that the constitutional protections extended to juvenile court
proceedings by In re Gault are not to be given retroactive effect in Florida
so as to upset proceedings occurring before the decision in GaultY.70
In avowedly following the holding of State v. Steinhauer,'71 the
Third District Court of Appeal has held that the rule of In re Gault is
neither to be applied retroactively to a juvenile court hearing wherein the
initial determination of delinquency is made, nor to a petition for revo-
165. Holman v. State, 203 So.2d 653 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
166. In re P., 220 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). But see the cases discussed under the
illegitimacy section of this Survey, p. 328 supra.
167. In re the Interest of V.F.B. v. State, 223 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
168. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
169. State v. Steinhauer, 216 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1968), rev'g Steinhauer v. State, 206 So.2d
25 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
170. Suit v. Weber, 210 So.2d 739 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
171. 216 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1968).
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cation of probation which was filed before Gault was decided but
which entailed a hearing that took place after the Gault decision,
when the court believed that the reliability of the ultimate fact finding
process was not measurably affected by the absence of counsel. The court
indicated that if the juvenile had stated to the juvenile court at this latter
hearing that he and his family were without funds to employ an attorney
and that he was ignorant of his right to state-supplied counsel, then the
court would have applied Gault in a retroactive fashion." 2
A juvenile who appeals from an order adjudicating him a delinquent
has the same right to the appointment of counsel as does a defendant on
appeal from a criminal conviction. If the juvenile who is appealing a
delinquency adjudication is completely destitute, he may not be denied
the benefit of the insolvency statute which provides for the appointment
of counsel at state expense on the basis that his parents have the ability
to bear the costs of the appeal. The parents are not under a legal duty to
furnish such funds.173
2. NOTICE TO JUVENILES' PARENTS
The failure to give written notice to the parents of a minor child
that he is to be tried in a criminal action does not make the proceedings
void when the record shows that the child's mother had actual (as dis-
tinguished from written) notice of the trial and was present with him in
the courtroom during the trial.'74 On the other hand, if the state sends
written notice to an address different from the one given by the minor
and this notice is returned with the notation "no such address," the sta-
tutory notice provision has not been complied with and the minor is
entitled to a new trial. 175
3. WAIVER OF JURISDICTION
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the Third District
Court of Appeal has held that it is proper for a juvenile court judge to
waive jurisdiction over a child and to certify the case to the circuit court
upon finding after a properly conducted hearing that the child is over age
fourteen; that the child, if an adult, would be charged with the crime of
murder; that as a result of the foregoing and together with a considera-
tion of the psychological and psychiatric evaluation performed, the child
is not a suitable candidate for the rehabilitation program of the juvenile
court; and that it is in the best interest of the public that jurisdiction be
waived. 76
172. Richardson v. State ex rel. Milton, 219 So.2d 77 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
173. In re L.G.T., 216 So.2d 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
174. Holloway v. State, 216 So.2d 248 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968), construing FLA. STAT.
§ 932.38 (1967).
175. Jackson v. State, 224 So.2d 734 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
176. B.P.W. v. State, 214 So.2d 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). For further waiver of jurisdic-
tion cases see L.W. v. State, 216 So.2d 479 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), and In re J.E.M. v. State,
217 So.2d 135 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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4. SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The scope of review of a finding of delinquency by a juvenile court
judge is limited to a determination of the question whether the juvenile
court judge misinterpreted the legal effect of the evidence as a whole or
whether in some fashion he departed from the essential requirements of
the law.177
5. LEGISLATION
Juveniles who are now taken into custody upon probable cause that
they have committed acts which would be felonious if they were adults
shall be fingerprinted and photographed. The fingerprints and photo-
graphs are to be kept in a separate file by the agency making the arrest
and the file is to be available only to the juvenile court, law enforcement
agencies, the juveniles, and their parents and attorneys. The act provides
procedures for destroying the file if the juveniles are acquitted, etc., and
for the distribution of the files to various law enforcement agencies upon
conviction.17 8
The juvenile court has been deprived of jurisdiction when a grand
jury indicts a juvenile of any age with a crime punishable by death or
life imprisonment, "and the child shall be handled, in every respect as if
he were an adult.' 179
The legislature has created the Florida Division of Youth Services
which has supervision over all state-owned facilities used for the deten-
tion, training, care, treatment, and aftercare supervision of children com-
mitted to it as delinquent or dependent children. The act appears to be
a comprehensive unified approach to the delinquency problem. s0
XII. GUARDIANSHIP
A. Adjudication of Incompetency
When an examining committee's report states that a "hippie" is suf-
fering from chronic schizophrenia without classifying the type of schizo-
phrenia, the committee members do not testify at the competency hearing,
and this opinion is in direct conflict with the testimony of the alleged in-
competent's expert that he is sane, there is insufficient evidence that the
alleged incompetent is incapable of caring for himself or of managing his
affairs. The judgment of incompetency is not supported by sufficient evi.-
dence.'
177. In re Marshall, 214 So.2d 486 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
178. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-113, at 327, amending FLA. STAT. § 39.03(6) (1967).
179. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-146, at 390, amending FLA. STAT. § 39.02 (6) (c) (1967).
180. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-365, at 762-69, adding chapter 959 to the Florida Statutes.
181. In re Sealy, 218 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
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B. Litigation Procedure
When a guardian is suing as a guardian it is improper for the defen-
dant to file a counterclaim against the guardian individually for acts al-
legedly committed by the guardian acting for her own benefit. A guardian
is regarded as a separate legal person while acting in this capacity' 2
C. Guardians and the Dead Man's Statute
In a suit brought by a guardian ad litem of an incompetent against
the guardian of the person of the incompetent and the guardian of the
property of the incompetent, it is permissible to call the guardian of the
person as an adverse witness, and the Dead Man's statute will not bar
this testimony because of the personal representative status of the guard-
ian. However, when the guardian ad litem and intervening children of
the incompetent call other children as their witnesses, then the Dead
Man's statute will apply. 83
D. Administration of the Estate
Section 744.53 of the Florida Statutes, which requires a guardian to
file an inventory of his ward's assets within sixty days from the date of
the guardian's appointment, is mandatory rather than directory. How-
ever, in the event that a guardian fails to file an inventory but later testi-
fies under oath (in a hearing objecting to the guardian's discharge) and
gives full disclosure of all assets which came into his possession; files ac-
countings of his administration; and no contention is made that his ac-
counting was false or erroneous and no evidence is submitted that the
estate suffered a loss as the result of his failure to file the inventory, the
sworn testimony may be considered as "tantamount to a verified inven-
tory of the assets owned by the ward .... ,11" As a result, the error of the
probate court in failing to require the inventory is a harmless one under
these facts.
An interesting aspect of the law of guardianship as it relates to
devises was involved in Forbes v. Burket.18 5 A testator devised real prop-
erty and was later declared incompetent. His guardian was given court
permission to sell the devised property, and subsequently the testator
died. The records of the guardianship revealed that the proceeds of this
sale were not necessary for the support of the ward because there was
sufficient income available for this purpose, and at the time of death of
the ward there were more funds available in the estate than in the
proceeds of the sale. As a result, the district court held that the inten-
182. Hall v. McDonough, 216 So.2d 84 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968), construing FLA. R. CIV. P.
1.170.
183. Roberts v. Bryant, 201 So.2d 811 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
184. In re Estate of Dobbins, 215 So.2d 312, 313 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
185. 208 So.2d 670 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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tion of the testator to make this specific devise should be carried out
and the amount of the proceeds of the sale of this property should be
paid to the devisee without requiring any tracing of the proceeds.1 86
XIII. ILLEGITIMACY
The proper venue in bastardy actions is in the county in which
the mother resides or in the county in which the father resides, under
section 742.021 of the Florida Statutes. Section 46.01, the general venue
statute which gives the defendant the right to be sued in the county
in which he resides, is controlled by section 742.021. Hence, the mother
may choose to sue in the county in which she resides over the con-
tention of the alleged father that he has a right to be sued in his home
county.187
A woman cannot have her child declared illegitimate and receive
support for it from the putative father if she was married to another
person at the time of conception. 8 On the other hand, the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal has held that an annulment of a marriage se-
cured by the husband renders the woman unmarried, and she thereby
has standing to bring bastardy proceedings against another man (who
was married) who was intimate with her. Further, the "presumption"
that a child who is born after wedlock is the legitimate child of the
husband is a rebuttable presumption which may be overcome by med-
ical and other proof that the husband is not the father and that the
child was sired by another.8 9
XIV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Interfamily Tort Actions
In a case of apparent first impression, the Second District Court
of Appeal has held that a minor child may not maintain a suit against
his parents for injuries suffered as a result of his parents' alleged neg-
ligence in providing an "unsafe place" for him to play.90 The same
court had previously ruled that a parent of a deceased minor child may
not sue another of his minor children for his negligence in causing the
death of his sibling. 9' In a similar vein, another district court held that
an unemancipated minor may not sue his parent for personal injuries
186. Id. at 673.
187. Paulett v. Hickey, 206 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
188. Kennelly v. Davis, 221 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1969), aff'g Kennelly v. Davis, 216 So.2d
795 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). The Third District Court of Appeal had held that a married
woman cannot maintain bastardy proceedings against her paramour for a child conceived
during wedlock, even though the facts indicate that the woman's husband could not possibly
be the father of the child and the paramour admitted the fact of intercourse during the
conception period.
189. B.S.B. v. B.S.F., 217 So.2d 599 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
190. Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So.2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967)
191. Meehan v. Meehan, 133 So.2d 776 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
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caused by the simple and gross negligence of the parent which caused
an automobile accident.'92 These decisions are based upon the notion
that the allowance of suit would interfere with family unity and family
discipline. Sense or Nonsense? The courts are really protecting insur-
ance companies, not family unity.
A slight turning away from the interfamily tort rule was expressed
in Gaston v. Pittman, 1'3 wherein the Supreme Court of Florida held
that when a woman's child (by a prior marriage) was killed through
the negligence of a man who subsequently married the woman the cause
of action was not extinguished but merely abated during the continuance
of the marriage. Upon divorce of the couple the procedural bar was
lifted, and the mother could sue her former husband for the tort com-
mitted prior to their marriage.
B. Wrongful Death Actions
The right to recover for the loss of a deceased child's services
belongs to the parent who was actually supporting the child, regardless
of the fact that the parents might be separated and no court order
awarding custody had been entered. 94
A forty-two year old daughter who is one-hundred percent disabled
and totally dependent upon her mother for financial support is a "de-
pendent" under the wrongful death statute and may sue for the wrongful
death of the mother. Under the "collateral source rule," the fact that
the daughter received a lump-sum divorce settlement from her former
husband would not serve to decrease the liability of the tort-feasor. 95
C. Inheritance
Section 731.23 of the Florida Statutes has been amended to permit
parents to disclaim, renounce, or refuse in writing any inheritance of real
and personal property from any child of such parent. The written dis-
claimer may be made prior to or within thirty days after the death of
the child and "a parent . . .shall be deemed to have predeceased such
child.' l 6
192. Denault v. Denault, 220 So.2d 27 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
193. 224 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1969).
194. Williams v. Legree, 206 So.2d 13 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
195. Wadsworth v. Friend, 201 So.2d 641 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
196. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-173, at 415.
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